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I. INTRODUCTION
Left-libertarianism, like the more familiar right-libertarianism, holds
that agents initially fully own themselves.1 Unlike right-libertarianism,
however, it views natural resources as belonging to everyone in some
egalitarian manner. Left-libertarianism is thus a form of liberal egalitarianism
in that it recognizes both liberty rights and equality rights. In this
Article, I shall lay out the reasons why (1) left libertarianism holds that
* Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia. For helpful comments, I thank
Harriet Baber, Jason Glahn, Eric Heidenreich, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Mike Otsuka,
Erich Roark, Hillel Steiner, Alan Tomhave, Jon Trerise, and the participants at the
workshop on private discrimination at the Institute of Law and Philosophy, University of
San Diego, Spring 2006.
1. Peter Vallentyne, Left-Libertarianism: A Primer, in LEFT LIBERTARIANISM AND
ITS CRITICS: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 1 (Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner eds.,
2000).
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(a) private discrimination is not intrinsically unjust and (b) it is
intrinsically unjust for the state to prohibit private discrimination; and
(2) that, nonetheless, a plausible version of left libertarianism holds that
it is unjust for the state, and many private individuals, to refrain from taking
steps to offset the negative effects of systematic private discrimination.
The basic line is not new; it is simply that there is nothing unjust in
principle with private discrimination, but there is something unjust about
doing nothing to promote equal life prospects.
II. PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION
This discussion focuses primarily on private discrimination, which is
discrimination by individuals as citizens, as opposed to state discrimination,
which is discrimination by individuals in their capacities as government
officials or in the content of laws and other state policies and procedures.
There are strong grounds for morally condemning various kinds of state
discrimination, but the focus of this Article is on private discrimination,
which includes discrimination in hiring, market exchange, and private
association.
What then, is discrimination? In its broadest sense, one discriminates
against or in favor of a person when one treats that person less or more
favorably because of some feature one believes the individual possesses.
For example, I discriminate against the young man when I help the
elderly lady with her groceries, but I do not help him. No one thinks that
discrimination in this broad sense is intrinsically morally problematic.
Indeed, no one thinks that it is always morally better to refrain from such
discrimination. Discrimination need not be problematic when its effects
are minor (for example, when I refuse to shake hands on February 28
with anyone born on that day), when the person is suitably responsible
for having a feature (being a murderer), or where the discrimination is
based on the best available statistical predictors.2
Because this Article argues that discrimination is not intrinsically
unjust, it will, for purposes of simplicity, focus only on the most
despicable kind of discrimination—invidious discrimination. Invidious
discrimination against an individual is here understood as the treatment
of an individual less favorably because of some feature one believes the
individual to possess, where (1) the person is not morally or prudentially
responsible for having the feature in question; and (2) the treatment is
based on (a) a mistaken belief in the moral inferiority of those having the
2. For example, basing insurance rates on all known relevant factors, including
the fact that young men are more likely than any other demographic to be involved in
accidents.
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feature, (b) a significantly mistaken empirical belief about people having
the feature, or (c) hatred of those having the feature. For this discussion,
I take standard cases of racism and sexism to be forms of invidious
discrimination. This Article implicitly restricts its attention to socially
significant discrimination—discrimination the net effect of which is
significant and negative for many individuals having the feature in
question.3
This Article also describes a plausible version of left libertarianism
and shows that it holds (1) invidious discrimination is not intrinsically
unjust; (2) that it is intrinsically unjust for the state to prohibit invidious
discrimination as such; and (3) nonetheless, the state, on behalf of its
citizens, has a duty of justice to eliminate or reduce the negative effects
of such discrimination.
III. JUSTICE AND MORAL ASSESSMENT
Actions can be assessed from many different normative perspectives,
justice being only one. Here, I shall comment on a few of such perspectives
with respect to invidious discrimination.
One perspective is that of personal ideals. Although this typically
involves some moral considerations, it is not based exclusively on such
considerations. For example, my personal ideals attach great importance
to musical achievements, but not much importance to athletic achievements.
I do not, however, view musical achievements as morally more important
than athletic achievements, nor do I view having no musical achievements
as a moral defect. At the level of personal ideals, I of course find invidious
discrimination despicable, at least in those cases where the discrimination is
based on hatred or unreasonable, false beliefs. I would not be friends
with anyone who engages in such discrimination. This, however, does
not establish that there is anything morally problematic with invidious
discrimination.
3. For useful discussions of discrimination, see generally Larry Alexander, What
Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1992); Richard J. Arneson, Against Rawlsian Equality of
Opportunity, 93 PHIL. STUD. 77 (1999); Richard J. Arneson, Disability, Discrimination,
and Priority, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW
FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 18 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds.,
2000); MATT CAVANAGH, AGAINST EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 153-207 (2002); JAN
NARVESON, Have We a Right to Nondiscrimination?, reprinted in RESPECTING PERSONS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ESSAYS ON MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 203 (2002);
Peter Singer, Is Racial Discrimination Arbitrary?, 8 PHIL. Q. OF ISRAEL 185 (1978).
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Another perspective is that of moral ideals, understood to be what is
morally desirable or good. I have some general qualms about how much
content the notion of moral goodness has, but if I set those aside, I fully
agree that it is morally desirable not to engage in invidious discrimination.
That, however, leaves open whether it is morally wrong to do so. Not
everything that is morally desirable need be morally obligatory and thus
wrong not to do. For example, it is often morally desirable to give away
most of one’s wealth to help feed the starving, but it may not be morally
wrong not do so.4
Another perspective is that of moral permissibility. Here, we must
distinguish between two subperspectives: interpersonal morality and
impersonal morality. Interpersonal morality is concerned with assessing
when an action wrongs someone, or violates a duty owed to that person.
On the other hand, impersonal morality is concerned with impersonal
wrongs, or actions that are wrong, but not in virtue of wronging anyone.
An example of impersonal morality is destroying a rare cultural artifact
that no one cares about. I would argue that there are no impersonal
wrongs, but that is beyond the scope of the present paper. Instead, I will
grant that if there are some impersonal wrongs, invidious discrimination
may be among them. This is not much of a concession, since almost
everyone who holds that invidious discrimination is wrong believes so
because it wrongs the victim.
In the discussion that follows, I focus exclusively on interpersonal
morality, or wrongs to individuals, and I shall use the term justice to
designate that which is interpersonally permissible—that which wrongs
no one. Justice in this sense is concerned with what duties we owe each
other. Admittedly, justice is confusedly used in many other senses, but I
will use it stipulatively in this sense. I shall also describe a plausible
version of left libertarianism and show that it holds (1) that invidious
discrimination is not intrinsically unjust; (2) that it is intrinsically unjust
for the state to prohibit invidious discrimination as such; and (3)
nonetheless, the state, on behalf of its citizens, has a duty of justice to
eliminate or reduce the negative effects of such discrimination.
IV. LEFT LIBERTARIANISM
Libertarianism holds that agents initially fully own themselves.5
Agents are full self-owners in that they own themselves in precisely the
same way that they can fully own inanimate objects. Stated differently,
4. Of course, maximizing consequentialists will deny this. Here I merely mean to
set up the issue in a general way, independent of any particular moral view.
5. Vallentyne, supra note 1, at 1-5.
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full self-owners own themselves in the same way that a full chattelslave-owner owns a slave. Throughout the Article, we are concerned
with moral ownership and not legal ownership. In the days when
slavery was legal, those who were legal slaves were moral self-owners
because they had the same moral rights over themselves as everyone
else.
Full self-ownership consists of full private ownership of one’s person.
Full private ownership of an entity consists of a full set of the following
ownership rights: (1) control rights over the use of the entity (liberty
rights to use it and claim rights against others using it); (2) rights to
compensation if someone uses the entity without one’s permission; (3)
enforcement rights (rights to use force to prevent the violation of these
rights or to extract compensation owed for past violation); (4) immunities
against the non-consensual loss of these rights; and (5) rights to transfer
any of these rights to others (powers of sale, rental, gift, or loan).6
All forms of libertarianism endorse full self-ownership. They differ
with respect to the liberties persons have to use, or the moral powers
they have to acquire, ownership of natural resources. Natural resources
are all the resources in the world, in their unimproved form, that were
not created by any non-divine agent. These include space, land, air, and
minerals in their original unimproved state. The most well-known
versions of libertarianism are right-libertarian theories, which hold that
agents have a very strong moral power to acquire full private ownership
of unowned things. Left-libertarians, by contrast, hold that natural resources
(such as space, land, minerals, air, and water) belong to everyone in
some egalitarian manner and thus cannot be privately appropriated
without their consent or significant compensatory payment to them.7
There are many different versions of left libertarianism, but this
Article focuses on two: the equal share view and the equal opportunity
for well-being view. Like right-libertarianism, each view holds that
individuals have the moral power to appropriate unowned natural
resources. Unlike right-libertarianism, however, both hold that ownership

6.
7.

See id.
For more on left libertarianism, see generally THE ORIGINS OF LEFTLIBERTARIANISM (Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner eds., 2000). For a critical assessment of
left libertarianism, see Barbara H. Fried, Left-Libertarianism: A Review Essay, 32 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 66 (2004), and Peter Vallentyne et al., Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not
Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 201
(2005).
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of natural resources is always conditional upon paying rent based on the
competitive value, or supply and demand, of the rights claimed over
those resources. Strictly speaking, both views deny that individuals can
fully own natural resources, because their rights over them are always
conditional on the payment of the competitive rent. As long as the rent
payment is made, however, individuals may have all the other rights of
full ownership.8
The two versions of left libertarianism that this Article considers differ
with respect to their view on how the rent fund is to be allocated. The
equal share view holds that everyone has a right to an equal share of the
value of natural resources and thus a right to an equal share of the rent
fund.9 The equal opportunity for well-being view holds that everyone
has a right to whatever share of the value of natural resources—and
hence of the rent fund—provides them with an equal opportunity for
well-being.10 Under this view, the rent fund may be divided up unequally,
with more going to those who suffer from unchosen disadvantages in their
genetic endowments, childhood environments, and so on.11
According to equal opportunity left libertarianism, each individual has
a duty to pay competitive rent on the rights over natural resources that
she claims.12 Moreover, the rent must be spent so as to efficiently
promote equality of opportunity for well-being. For simplicity, this
Article assumes that the rental payment is paid to the state in the form of
a tax, and that the state then uses the funds to promote equality of
opportunity. If there is no state, or if the state would not distribute the
funds appropriately, then the individual has a duty to distribute them
directly.
Obviously, left libertarianism, like other theories of justice, is a highly
controversial view, but this Article does not attempt to defend it.
Moreover, I shall simply assume, as I believe, that the equal opportunity
for well-being view is a plausible one on which I shall focus my
attention. My goal is thus quite limited: to draw out the implications of
equal opportunity left libertarianism for the justness of invidious
discrimination and state responses thereto.

8. See Vallentyne, supra note 1, at 5-11.
9. See, e.g., HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS (1994).
10. See, e.g., MICHAEL OTSUKA, LIBERTARIANISM WITHOUT INEQUALITY (2003).
Though the version that I invoke here differs in some ways from Otsuka’s view, the
differences are not essential for present purposes.
11. For simplicity, I ignore the difference between equality of opportunity for
well-being, which is not sensitive to later brute luck, and equality of brute luck wellbeing. See generally, Peter Vallentyne, Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial
Opportunities, 112 ETHICS 529 (2002).
12. See Vallentyne, supra note 1, at 5-11.
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V. A LEFT LIBERTARIAN ASSESSMENT OF PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION
AND ASSOCIATED STATE RESPONSES
I shall first argue that equal opportunity left libertarianism does not
view invidious discrimination as intrinsically unjust. I shall then argue
that it views state prohibition of invidious discrimination as intrinsically
unjust. Finally, I shall argue that equal opportunity left libertarianism
holds that individuals, or the state on their behalf, often have a duty of
justice to offset the negative effects of invidious discrimination by
others.
An action is just if and only if it wrongs no one, that is, if and only if it
does not violate an individual’s rights, where rights are broadly construed to
correspond to duties owed to individuals. From the perspective of equal
opportunity left libertarianism, we thus need to ask whether invidious
discrimination violates the victim’s rights of self-ownership, her rights
of ownership of artifacts or natural resources, or her limited right, based
on amount of rent owed for natural resources, to an equal opportunity for
well-being.13
Invidious discrimination need not violate the libertarian or moral
property rights of individuals. The racist who refuses to befriend, hire,
work for, buy from, or sell to the black person does not violate any of
her property rights. In addition, invidious discrimination need not
violate the victim’s right to an equal opportunity for a good life. A manhating bigot does not violate anyone’s right to an equal opportunity for a
good life when she invidiously discriminates against the man who is
above average in his opportunities for a good life—rich, handsome,
smart, happy, accomplished, loved by friends and family, and so on.
Moreover, even invidious discrimination against a person with significantly
below average life prospects is not always unjust. One may indeed have
a duty of justice to help that person, but it need not take the form of
refraining from invidious discrimination. That duty can be met, for
example, by making an appropriate cash payment, or by providing other
sorts of aid.
Thus, according to equal opportunity left libertarianism, invidious
discrimination is not intrinsically unjust. Of course, it is often and
13. Of course, invidious discrimination can violate these left libertarian rights—as
when someone murders on the basis of invidious discrimination. Our question is,
however, whether invidious discrimination is intrinsically unjust, that is, whether it
always violates the victim’s rights.
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probably typically unjust. Much invidious discrimination involves personal
violence, property damage, or disadvantaging without compensation
those who have less than an average opportunity for a good life. The
crucial point is that what makes such invidious discrimination unjust is
the violation of property rights or of the limited right to an equal
opportunity for a good life. According to equal opportunity left
libertarianism, it is not invidious discrimination as such that is unjust.
Moreover, equal opportunity left libertarianism judges it unjust for the
state to prohibit, or for others to forcibly prevent, invidious discrimination—
except, of course, with the consent of those whose liberty is restricted.
The use of force against a person to stop her from engaging in an activity
that does not violate anyone’s rights violates her left libertarian rights
and is unjust. For example, it is unjust for the state to stop me from
playing my piano quietly in the privacy of my home. Likewise, it is
unjust to use force to punish or extract payment for past actions that did
not violate anyone’s rights. Here left libertarianism takes a different
position from standard versions of equality of opportunity egalitarianism.14
These unconstrained versions of egalitarianism agree that invidious
discrimination is not intrinsically unjust, but they also hold that state
prohibition of invidious discrimination is not intrinsically unjust. If the
consequences of the prohibition suitably promote equality of life
prospects, these versions of egalitarianism will judge the prohibition
just. Equal opportunity left libertarianism, however, holds that there are
certain constraints—the libertarian rights—on how equality may permissibly
be promoted.15 Just as equal opportunity left libertarianism judges it unjust
to promote equality by forcibly taking someone’s kidney for another’s
benefit, it also judges it unjust to forcibly prevent someone from engaging
in activities that do not violate anyone’s rights.
Although it is unjust for the state to prohibit all invidious discrimination,
it is also unjust for the state, and private individuals, to ignore the often
systematic and very significant negative effects of invidious discrimination.
Such discrimination is a major source of inequality in life prospects, and
the state, on behalf of the citizens, has a duty of justice to promote
equality of opportunity for a good life to the extent feasible with the
natural resource rent fund. All else being equal, this requires giving extra
resources, such as money, education, or other opportunities to those who
have suffered from invidious discrimination. Of course, there are other
sources of poor life prospects, such as genetic endowments, financial
endowments from gifts and bequests, childhood environment, and so on.
14. Equality of opportunity egalitarianism does not recognize any basic libertarian
property rights.
15. See Vallentyne, supra note 1, at 5-11.
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Those who suffer from invidious discrimination, but benefit from other
brute luck advantages, may already have above average life prospects
and thus may be owed no help.
Finally, the left libertarian duty to promote equality of opportunity for
a good life is a duty to promote long-run equality and to do so efficiently
via the rent fund. It does not focus solely on present or immediate
inequalities of opportunities; it is also concerned with reducing future
inequalities. Thus, where it is an efficient way of promoting long-run
equality, as I believe it typically will be, the state has a duty of justice to
use education and incentives to reduce future invidious discrimination.
It should be noted, however, that equal opportunity left libertarianism
recognizes only a limited duty to promote equality of opportunity—one
based on the amount of rent that one owes for ownership of natural
resources. It thus allows that justice may not require perfect equality. In
particular, it does not guarantee that those who suffer the negative
effects of invidious discrimination will be fully compensated, nor that
the state will minimize future invidious discrimination. Those who favor a
stronger equality requirement, for example, maximizing egalitarians,
will of course find this feature objectionable. The issue here concerns
how demanding the requirements of justice are, for example, how much
freedom they leave us to pursue our own projects. I would argue that the
demands of equality are strong, but not all encompassing in the sense
that there is some kind of limitation on the duty to promote equality.
However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake this defense
or to defend the specific left libertarian limitation that I have invoked.
My goal is simply to work on the implications of this view for invidious
discrimination.
VI. OBJECTIONS TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LEFT LIBERTARIANISM
Obviously, there are many aspects of equal opportunity left libertarianism
that may be challenged. One could challenge the libertarian claim that
individuals have property rights in themselves and in external things that
ensure the injustice of state prohibitions of invidious discrimination.
One could also challenge the egalitarian claim that individuals, and the
state on their behalf, have a duty to compensate and reduce future
instances of invidious discrimination that disadvantage those with less
than average life prospects. This discussion, however, is limited to
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addressing challenges directly relevant to the claim that invidious
discrimination in not intrinsically unjust.16 The most important of such
challenges is the claim that individuals have rights that (1) are not
recognized by equal opportunity left libertarianism; and (2) are always
violated by invidious discrimination. If this argument is correct, then
invidious discrimination is intrinsically unjust.
One might claim that individuals have a right not to be treated on the
basis of characteristics for which they are not responsible. This view is
clearly mistaken and entails that it is unjust to make choices in romantic
or sexual partners on the basis of the sex of individuals. Alternatively,
one might claim that individuals have a right to be treated on the basis of
their earned desert. This too cannot be right. I may be a far more deserving
person than Slick, and I may even be far more deserving than he of
Agatha’s love and companionship because of my feeling for and
attentions to her. That, however, does not give me a right to her love or
companionship. I am not wronged if she gives me no attention whatsoever.17
Of course, it may be objected that the above examples fail to take into
account that invidious discrimination is often systematic in society with
profound effects on life prospects. It is one thing for one person to be
denied the love of another; it is quite another for a black person to be
systematically denied jobs, housing, and so on. With this, I fully agree.
The relevant point, however, is that some individuals are suffering
significant disadvantages in life prospects. This is what is problematic.
If invidious discrimination were widespread and systematic but resulted
in equal life prospects, for example, everyone has otherwise equal life
prospects and everyone is equally subject to the effects of invidious
discrimination, it would not be as disturbing.18
There is, of course, a strand of egalitarian thinking that challenges this
emphasis on overall life prospects. It claims that (1) it is only certain
basic goods that must equalized; (2) these basic goods include the good
of full recognition of one’s moral worth or status; and (3) for these basic
goods, each good must be equally present—it is not sufficient for the
total package of such goods to be equal. Here, I shall not worry about
what determines whether a good is basic, although this is an important
problem, and I shall simply assume that full recognition of one’s moral
status is such a good.
16. For criticisms of both libertarianism and egalitarianism on the topic of
discrimination, see CAVANAGH, supra note 3.
17. For further criticism of these views, see id.
18. Of course, it might still typically be problematic for efficiency reasons, since
false beliefs and hatred preclude various forms of cooperation. Thus, there may typically
be an egalitarian duty to reduce invidious discrimination through education, incentives,
and other admissible means.
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The claim that only basic goods need to be equalized is highly dubious.
Even if certain goods are basic and more important than other goods,
there is little reason to exclude the others from the purview of the
egalitarian requirement. At least sometimes, increasing enough nonbasic goods is more important for an individual than increasing some
basic good. Still, let us grant this assumption for the sake of argument.19
Suppose, then, that only basic goods need be equalized and that full
recognition of one’s moral status is a basic good. This is still not
sufficient to judge invidious discrimination unjust.20 Thus, invidious
discrimination, as defined in this Article, need not involve failure to
fully recognize the moral status of the victim. One can invidiously
discriminate on the basis of a false empirical belief or hatred while fully
recognizing the moral status of the victim. One could, for example, fully
believe that women have equal moral status with men, but falsely
believe that they are incapable of being effective CEOs.
Let us therefore restrict our attention to disrespectful discrimination,
which is here understood as invidious discrimination based on a
mistaken belief in the moral inferiority of those having the relevant
feature and thus a failure to fully recognize their moral status.21 Even if
equality is only concerned with basic goods, of which full recognition of
moral status is one, it does not follow that disrespectful discrimination is
intrinsically unjust. After all, some other basic goods might offset the
negative effects of the discrimination. The victim of disrespectful
discrimination, that is, need not be below average with respect to the
overall value of basic goods. He might be rich, handsome, loved, happy,
and so on.
In response to this view, a basic goods egalitarian might reply that
each basic good must be equalized. It is not enough to equalize the
overall package of basic goods. It is quite mysterious, however, why
one should suppose this. From the victim’s perspective, basic goods
19. For discussion of related issues, see Peter Vallentyne, Debate: Capabilities
Versus Opportunities for Well-Being, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 359 (2005).
20. Recall that invidious discrimination against a person consists of treating her
less favorably because of some feature one believes her to have, where (1) the person is
not morally or prudentially responsible for possessing the feature in question; and (2) the
treatment is based on (a) a mistaken belief in the moral inferiority of those having the
feature, (b) a significantly mistaken empirical belief about people having the feature, or
(c) hatred of those having the feature.
21. For a defense of the wrongness of disrespectful (or contemptuous) discrimination,
see CAVANAGH, supra note 3, at 153-207.
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can, at least normally, be traded off. For example, most people would
prefer to experience a small increase in disrespectful discrimination
conjoined with a major increase in other basic goods, such as health, to
no change in either. Even if one focuses only on basic goods, it is the
value to the individual of the overall bundle of basic goods that matters.
Individual basic goods should not be fetishized.
Even if we grant that each basic good must be equalized, it still does
not follow that disrespectful discrimination is intrinsically unjust. Under
some rare circumstances, engaging in disrespectful discrimination may
be the most effective means of reducing the future harmful effects of
disrespectful discrimination, or other basic goods. For example, it is
possible that the misogynist’s disrespectful discrimination against a
racist white woman, by refusing her a job, for example, will sometimes
make her less inclined to disrespectfully discriminate against AfricanAmericans. The intrinsic injustice of disrespectful discrimination follows
(not surprisingly) only if there is a deontological restriction against
avoidably failing to equalize each basic good. Whether there is any such
restriction is, of course, the crux of the matter. I shall not attempt to
systematically argue against this view. I merely note that it seems quite
implausible. Our concern should be with giving people equal life
prospects. We should be concerned with the net effect of all goods—and
not rule out any non-basic goods or insist on equalizing each good. We
should take a consequentialist perspective that favors promoting longrun equality of life prospects and not a deontological perspective that
requires us to provide equality now independently of later effects, or so I
would argue.22
In sum, I have argued that individuals do not have a right not to be
discriminated against on the basis of characteristics for which they are
not responsible, or a right to be treated on the basis of their desert. I
have also argued that, even if a right to equality of each basic good (on
some criterion) exists and full recognition of one’s moral status is a basic
good, it does not follow that invidious, or even disrespectful, discrimination
is unjust. Of course, there may be other rights that establish the injustice of
invidious discrimination, but I know of no promising ones. I therefore
provisionally conclude that the equal opportunity left libertarian account
of private discrimination is correct.
VII. CONCLUSION
At the level of personal ideals, I find invidious discrimination
despicable and deeply troubling. At the level of moral ideals, setting
22.

992

For related discussion, see Vallentyne, supra note 19.

VALLENTYNE_POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC

[VOL. 43: 981, 2006]

2/26/2007 1:31:00 PM

Left Libertarianism and Private Discrimination
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

aside some general concerns I have about how much content there is to
the notion of moral goodness, it is morally undesirable. If there are any
impersonal wrongs (and I deny that there are any), invidious discrimination
may be among them. My focus, however, has been on the justice of
invidious discrimination, that is, on the question of whether it wrongs
anyone.
I have assumed, without defense, equal opportunity left libertarianism
and addressed its implications for invidious discrimination. Like
consequentialist egalitarianism, it sees no intrinsic injustice in invidious
discrimination. Such discrimination often deprives individuals of their
fair share of life prospects, and when it does, it is unjust. It is not,
however, unjust when it does not. Like right-libertarianism, but unlike
consequentialist egalitarianism, equal opportunity left libertarianism judges
it unjust to forcibly prevent, punish, or extract compensation from a
person who is committing no injustice. It thus judges it unjust for the
state to prohibit invidious discrimination. Finally, like consequentialist
egalitarianism, but unlike right-libertarianism, equal opportunity left
libertarianism judges that individuals—and on their behalf, the state—
have a duty of justice to promote equality of opportunity. Very often,
but not always, this will take the form of compensating victims of
invidious discrimination or taking steps through education and incentives to
reduce its occurrence.
Obviously, the ultimate importance of these observations depends on
the plausibility of equal opportunity left libertarianism. What I have
done here is simply help clarify the implications of this position while
offering a limited defense of its implications on the topic of private
discrimination.
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